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 1 
Turning Anti-Discrimination Laws on their Head:  Using Rhetoric to attempt to turn the 
Medicine into the Illness 
 
Introduction 
 
 Justice Scalia points out a “Kulturekampf” in his dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans,1 
referring to the battle between traditional moralists (often religious groups) and proponents of 
anti-discrimination laws dealing with sexual orientation.  One must appreciate the irony that five 
years earlier, it was Justice Scalia who authored the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.
2
   Smith arguably placed religious organizations on the defensive, resulting in 
an abundance of rhetoric featuring claims that “religion is under attack” and that compliance 
with anti-discrimination requirements is, in-and-of-itself, discrimination against religion.
3
  While 
there may be colorable claims to such a statement when dealing with religious and wholly-
private expressive institutions in certain circumstances, applying the same arguments to anti-
discrimination statutes in all circumstances is patently disingenuous.  The modern rhetoric is 
skilled at weaving a tapestry of justification for religious exceptions out of many different legal 
threads.  When one reaches the result, it looks coherent and sound, but upon closer scrutiny (or a 
good wash) it falls to pieces.  The recent case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
4
 highlights 
how tangled the rationales have become and how the rhetoric of “attacks” and “discrimination by 
anti-discrimination” has obscured the real legal arguments at issue. 
 Part I of this paper will attempt to explain the current state of the law as it relates to 
regulations that have run up against the religious protections of the First Amendment in various 
                                                        
1
 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2
 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3
 See, e.g. Kristen Moulton, U. President: Mormons should join ACLU, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, April 4, 2011; 
Alliance Defense Fund – The Homosexual Agenda: The Principal Threat to Your Religious Freedom, 
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/Marriage (“There is no doubt that God’s plan for marriage is under an all-out, 
full-scale attack by advocates of same-sex ‘marriage’ and the homosexual legal agenda.”); Morality in Media, On 
the ‘Religious Right,’ We Too Have a ‘Blind Side’, CHRISTIAN NEWSWIRE, Dec. 29, 2009. 
4
 Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 2 
situations.  This examination will focus on the developments from Smith to Martinez and show 
that there are distinct spheres in which the First Amendment protections must allow some “give.”  
This part will be heavy on theory, but it is necessary to establish this framework to truly reach 
the doctrinal analysis in the subsequent sections.  Part II will examine the legal arguments and 
rhetoric from religious organizations such as Christian Legal Society, and expose how their 
misrepresentations and fundamentally flawed arguments work to obscure debate on the actual 
legal issues.  The analysis will focus primarily on the Martinez case as an example and include 
other precedent and opinion which was expressed during the lead-up to the ultimate holding in 
Martinez.  This section will also highlight that starting at least as far back from the case of Boy 
Scouts v. Dale,
5
 Christian Legal Society was planning on bringing such a suit as was at issue in 
Martinez.  One could intimate that by building up a stockpile of Court-sanctioned religious-
exceptions, Christian Legal was looking to raise an issue of religious exception in a variety of 
areas so that they might knit together the holdings into a jurisprudence of preferential exceptions 
and circumvent the Court’s declaration in Smith.  This section will conclude demonstrating how 
effective the rhetoric of “religious exception” has permeated legal landscape, even when its use 
is imprecise by analyzing an article by Dean Howarth of Michigan State College of Law.  Part III 
will take a step back from the narrow focus on Martinez and its forbearers, and examine how the 
rhetoric has been employed to expand religious exemptions in the larger spheres, specifically in 
state statutes regarding civil marriage.  By framing the debate in the guise of “religious 
protection” or “religious freedom,” anti-discrimination laws are being whittled away.  Finally, 
this paper will conclude reiterating that in approaching religious exemptions versus neutral, anti-
discrimination laws, one must look to the proper sphere of First Amendment guarantees to gain 
perspective on whether an exemption is or is not appropriate. 
                                                        
5
 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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Part I – Conceptualizing the Current State of the Law 
 
 “The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires.”6  The operative words used by the Court are “believe” 
and “profess”, not “act on.”  When it comes to the conduct and actions involved with the free 
exercise of religion, the Court has never been so magnanimous.   
This section will attempt to put free exercise into perspective in light of Supreme Court 
decisions from Smith to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.
7
  In approaching this analysis, the 
conceptual model of spheres within spheres 
seemed to provide a good structure for 
establishing the current state of the law in 
relation to absolute free exercise.  Figure one is 
a two-dimensional illustration. 
The model requires a bit of mental 
dusting and a mental trip back to high-school 
physics.  Imagine for a moment, a beam of 
light.  As it passes through each tinted sphere, it 
not only bends, but dims a bit each time.  Thus, someone standing at the center of the spheres 
would see something much different than someone standing near the outer edge.  Now replace 
that beam of light with the concept of free exercise of religion.  Outside the sphere of the State, it 
exists absolutely, but crossing into these spheres changes the experience of free exercise as it 
                                                        
6
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
7
 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
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moves through the layers.  Analysis of this model will begin with the outer sphere, representing 
the federal Constitution and government’s effects on free exercise. 
 
A. The Outer Sphere – The Constitution & Federal Law 
 
 At the outer edge of this wide sphere, one can imagine that First Amendment rights are at 
their apex.  The only constraints that come to bear on one’s freedom of expression, association, 
or free exercise of religion are those that would conflict with other portions of the Constitution.  
As we move away from the edge, however, various federal statutes and regulations necessarily 
come to bear on one’s behavior.  Such conflicting interests are resolved by placing a difficult 
burden on the Federal Government to justify any regulation that may infringe on the free 
exercise right guaranteed by the First Amendment.  The Federal Government may not infringe 
on a person's free exercise of religion, "even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability," except if the Government satisfies a “compelling interest test” where it must show 
that the infringement on free exercise rights is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
8
   
 The outer sphere thus presents a minimum level of resistance to the free exercise of 
religion, however existence in this sphere is conceptual rather than actual.  When a question of 
free exercise of religion is raised, it usually involves the state also exerting its authority. 
 
                                                        
8
 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006), citing Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2006).  This strict standard is a statutory creation.  
Justice Scalia scorned the use of the compelling interest test when dealing with generally applicable laws when 
writing for the majority in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)(discussed in more detail infra).  He 
stated that “[a]ny society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy…” Id. 
Congress however, overrode the Court’s decision by passing RFRA, reinstating the application of the compelling 
interest test.  Analysis of the history of RFRA is beyond the scope of this paper, however it is important to note that 
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court held that RFRA was not applicable against the 
states.  Therefore, while the Federal Government must satisfy the compelling interest test when defending a law of 
general applicability that burdens the free exercise of religion, a state does not have the same burden, and the Smith 
case is controlling. 
 5 
B. The Intermediate Spheres – State Laws & Private Expressive Organizations 
 
 The United States’ federal system creates a tension between the powers of the states to 
regulate the behaviors of their citizens while remaining in accord with federal constitutional 
protections.  This can be seen by the interaction (or lack thereof) between the state and the 
private organization.  The First Amendment of the United States’ Constitution9 bars states from 
infringing on the speech and associative conduct of people and private expressive 
organizations.
10
  Thus, private expressive organizations are protected by the Constitution from 
many federal and state restrictions.  The edge of the outer sphere sees a minimum amount of 
resistance to free exercise, and entering the intermediate sphere of state regulation adds 
additional burdens.  Private expressive organizations, despite finding a Constitutional shield 
from some state and federal laws, cannot be immune from all of them, and Employment Division 
v. Smith provides an excellent example of how free exercise must necessarily bend. 
 In Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation 
organization after they had been charged with ingesting peyote, an illegal drug in the State of 
Oregon, during a ceremony at the Native American Church.
11
  The respondents sued, ultimately 
presenting the Supreme Court with the question of “whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the 
reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug…”.12 
 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in response, answered that question in the 
affirmative, stating that the “right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation 
to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
                                                        
9
 The states also may also have First Amendment corollaries in their own constitutions. 
10
 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), where the concept of the First Amendment being applicable 
(incorporated) against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment was first stated by the Court. 
11
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
12
 Id. 
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proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”13  To permit such 
an exception would allow the respondents to use their religious motivation to place them 
“beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice.”14  
In essence, this would allow an individual “to become a law unto himself,” which the Court 
found contradictory to both “constitutional tradition and common sense.”15  Justice Scalia 
highlights this conclusion several times throughout the opinion: “We have never held that an 
individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law 
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.  On the contrary, the record of more than a 
century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”16 
 A state impermissibly intrudes into the protections afforded by the Free Exercise clause, 
however, when its regulations deviate from being neutral or generally applicable.  The majority 
points out that the exercising of religion can involve conduct such as “assembling for worship.”17  
Should a state seek “to ban such acts… only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or 
because of the religious belief that they display” it would be acting unconstitutionally.18  In such 
a case, the practice of assembling for a religious purpose is set aside from assemblies for other 
purposes and prohibited due to its religious component, a distinction that the First Amendment 
forbids. 
 Smith thus sets a boundary for our intermediate sphere.
19
  A state must be able to regulate 
the behavior of its citizenry, and if it incidentally burdens the exercise of religion through a 
generally applicable, constitutional, and valid provision, the protections of the First Amendment 
                                                        
13
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
14
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
15
 Id. at 885. 
16
 Id. at 878-79. 
17
 Id. at 877. 
18
 Id. 
19
 As the light green portion of Figure One depicts. 
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are not violated.
20
  Of course, this example is deceptively simple… it involves individuals and 
the act at issue is one of drug use, behavior generally looked upon with disfavor.  Complications 
arise, for instance, when free exercise involves a group, is partnered with another First 
Amendment right, such as freedom of association, or confronts a regulation which doesn’t garner 
overwhelming popular support.  In addition, states may try to regulate beyond their 
Constitutional authority and reach too far into the private organizational sphere.  It is here where 
we find cases such as Boy Scouts v. Dale
21
 and Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston.
22
   
 In both Dale and Hurley, the state was attempting to enforce anti-discriminatory practices 
on private expressive organizations through their public accommodations laws.
23
  Initially aimed 
at physical places, the scope of public accommodation laws has expanded, and with that 
expansion “the potential for conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First 
Amendment rights of organizations has increased.”24  This area of uncertainty where state law 
overlaps into private organizations’ sphere of autonomy has no clear boundary.  The 
controversies which arise from this realm will find their results extremely fact dependent.  In 
some cases, the state has not been seen overreaching when enforcing an antidiscrimination 
provision of its public accommodation laws against a private organization.  For example, the 
Supreme Court found that a state had a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against 
women, and enforcement of the statutes was appropriate when it “would not materially interfere 
                                                        
20
 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
21
 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
22
 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  In Figure One, this would be depicted by the darker green portion of the sphere, where state 
law tries to permeate more of the private organizations’ sphere. 
23
 In New Jersey, the statutes at issue were N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-6; in Massachusetts, the statute at issue 
was Mass. Gen. Laws § 272:98 (1992). 
24
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 657. 
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with the ideas that the organization sought to express.”25  The decision, however, turned on the 
function, philosophy, and how de facto “public” the organization was.  In Dale and Hurley, the 
murkiness of this realm is made even more evident by the courts’ disagreements about how to 
define the organizations and how that affects the interaction between state authority and First 
Amendment protections.
26
 
 In Hurley, a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendents of Irish immigrants formed 
an organization, GLIB, to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade organized by the South Boston 
Allied War Veterans Council.
27
  The Council refused to admit GLIB as a parade contingent, 
objecting to the perceived message – acceptance of non-heterosexual lifestyles – that GLIB’s 
participation would convey.
28
  Both the lower court and Massachusetts’ Supreme Judicial Court 
found the parade to fall under the statutory definition of a public accommodation, and thus could 
not discriminate on the basis of sexual-orientation.
29
  The lower court rejected an argument by 
the Council that the parade was private, and also stated it was “impossible to discern any specific 
expressive purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment.”30  The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
31
  Upon review, Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, 
stated that Massachusetts’ interpretation of its public accommodations law was applied in a 
                                                        
25
 Id. at 657-58, citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) and Rotary International v. Rotary 
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).   
26
 Note that in Hurley, free exercise is not the First Amendment guarantee at issue, rather the case deals more with 
freedom of speech and assembly.  Throughout all five of the main cases discussed in Part I (Gonzales, Smith, 
Hurley, Dale, and Martinez), each shares a common theme where a public law collides with a philosophy that is 
expressed by action.  Whether this philosophy is defined as a religious belief or expressive association, the person or 
persons who hold the belief claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated by the state.  While the Court in 
Hurley does not deem the parade “an expressive association,” it states in Dale that the analysis applied in both cases 
is similar, and therefore Hurley is necessary to understanding the current state of the law. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
27
 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 560. 
28
 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75. 
29
 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 562. 
30
 Id. at 563. 
31
 Id. at 564. 
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“peculiar way.”32  By those courts’ interpretation, “any contingent of protected individuals with a 
message would have the right to participate in [the Council’s] speech, so that the communication 
produced…would be shaped by all those protected by the law who wished to join in with some 
expressive demonstration of their own.”33  Where Massachusetts went wrong, according to the 
Court, is that it extended the reach of its public accommodations laws so far so as to turn the 
Council’s speech itself into a public accommodation.34  While a state has broad powers of 
regulation, there are limits to its reach.  The Court holds that Massachusetts’ use of public 
accommodation laws in this manner “violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”35 
 In Dale, a former Eagle Scout had his adult membership in the Boy Scouts revoked after 
the Boy Scouts learned that he is “an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist.”36  Dale sued 
the Boy Scouts, alleging that they had violated New Jersey’s public accommodations statute 
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public 
accommodation.”37  The Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior Court determined that 
the Boy Scouts “was not a place of public accommodation, and that, alternatively the Boy Scouts 
is a distinctly private group exempted from coverage under New Jersey’s law.”38  This 
interpretation would not be upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court, however, which reversed 
the Chancery court holding that the Boy Scouts was a place of public accommodation, was not 
exempt from the law, and had violated the law by revoking Dale’s membership based on his 
                                                        
32
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 661, citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. 
33
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 661, citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
34
 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
35
 Id. 
36
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644. 
37
 Id. at 645. 
38
 Id. 
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“avowed homosexuality.”39  Indeed, both courts had looked at the record and reached a different 
conclusion about where the boundary lies for the public and private spheres.  The Supreme Court 
determined that the Boy Scouts’ “large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than exclusive 
purpose, and practice of allowing non-members to attend meetings,” removed the organization 
from being “sufficiently personal or private” so as to “warrant constitutional protection’ under 
the freedom of intimate association.”40  Therefore, like Massachusetts, New Jersey has found that 
a private organization has sufficiently drifted into the public sphere so as to subject it to 
regulations from which it would otherwise be immune. 
 The Supreme Court, while unable to overturn the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
determination that the Boy Scouts is subject to New Jersey public accommodations laws, 
nonetheless reiterates that the record revealed the “Boy Scouts is a private, nonprofit 
organization.”41  And further, it is a private organization with an expressive purpose.42  As such, 
the state’s laws must, except under compelling circumstances, bend to the protections of the First 
Amendment rather than the reverse.
43
  “Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair 
                                                        
39
 Id. at 646. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 649.  The Court highlights that it believes the New Jersey Supreme Court overreached, that it 
“went a step further and applied its public accommodations law to a private entity without even attempting to tie the 
term ‘place’ to a physical location.” Id. at 657. 
The Boy Scouts concede that Scouting has received “several benefits from government, including a federal charter, 
the support of Presidents and members of Congress, access to some military facilities and equipment, use of public 
buildings and spaces for meetings, and sponsorship of some Troops by government entitites.” Brief for Petitioner, 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)(No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 122 at *15.  However 
as the US Catholic Conference highlights in its Amicus brief, “In the era of pervasive government, every 
organization that collaborates with government or participates in public programs is, therefore, under the lower 
court’s approach, potentially a ‘place of public accommodation.’” Brief for United States Catholic Conference and 
New Jersey Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000)(No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 131 at *8.  The Supreme Court seems to agree. 
42
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. 
43
 Id. 
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the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express… 
freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”44   
The Court is careful to note that an expressive association cannot “erect a shield against 
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular 
group would impair its message.”45  Again, there is a fact-based analysis to determine if the First 
Amendment’s protections can be overridden by regulations “adopted to serve compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas that cannot be achieved through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”46  Here, Dale is a self-professed leader in 
his community who is open and honest about his sexual orientation.
47
  The implication being that 
if Dale was not such a prominent “face” of a gay male scout, or was just “suspected” of being a 
homosexual, that the discrimination would clearly be about his status which may have led the 
Court to a different result.  While the Court did not confront that question, it did reference  
Hurley pointing out that “the parade holders did not wish to exclude the GLIB members because 
of their sexual orientations, but because they wanted to march behind a GLIB banner.”48  
Perhaps then, New Jersey’s public accommodations laws find no barrier in the First Amendment 
when it comes to non-heterosexuals who make no effort to be “avowed.” 
Hurley and Dale demonstrate that within the area in which public policy and First 
Amendment freedoms collide is a zone where determining which side will prevail requires 
careful scrutiny of the facts.  It is relevant how the organization behaves – how “public” or 
“private” it is, whether the organization has an expressive message, whether a state has 
determined a compelling interest exists, the identity of the person or people who are trying to 
                                                        
44
 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
45
 Id. at 653. 
46
 Id. at 648 (internal quotations omitted). 
47
 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
48
 Id. 
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gain access or recognition by the organization, etc.  What is clear, however, is that the Court is 
making its best effort to ensure that a balance is maintained between the competing interests.   
 
C. The Inner Spheres – The University Setting and Its Organizations 
 
The inner spheres for the purpose of this paper consist of the public university and its 
student organizations.  Set firmly within the state’s authority, it nonetheless is no stranger to 
controversies about institution policy and First Amendment protections. 
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Court was faced with a suit by the Christian 
Legal Society (CLS) against the University of California’s Hastings Law School.49  CLS alleged 
that Hastings’ requirement that it accept any student as a member in order to become a 
“Recognized Student Organization (RSO)” violated its First Amendment rights to free exercise 
and freedom of association.
50
  The crux of CLS’s complaint turned on the fact that it would have 
to accept members that may not share the organization’s beliefs on religion and sexual 
orientation in order to obtain the benefits of RSO status.
51
   
Part of the Court’s decision resembles the outcome seen Smith.  Justice Ginsburg, writing 
for the majority, states that an “all-comers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is 
textbook viewpoint neutral,” and holds it to be “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on 
access to the student-organization forum.”52  Recall the similar language in Smith: “We have 
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”53 
                                                        
49
 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978. 
50
 Id. at 2978-79. 
51
 Id. at 2978. 
52
 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993, 2978. 
53
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.  Intriguingly, Justice Scalia, the author of the Smith decision, joined the dissent in 
Martinez.  Unfortunately he did not compose the opinion and therefore it is not clear if he now disfavors Smith. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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The other component of the Court’s decision turns on the position of public universities 
within our theoretical spheres-model.  A public university is not synonymous with the state in its 
relationship to individuals within its bounds.  Open spaces within a university’s control are not 
deemed equivalent to the parks and streets and therefore “First Amendment rights… must be 
analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.”54  The edge of the 
university’s sphere thus begins to take form.  Whereas the state must permit speech and forms of 
expression to all groups, the Court has recognized that a university has a right “to exclude even 
First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with 
the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.”55  Therefore, in the “limited public 
forums” that the university may choose to make available within its bounds, it may “reserve[] it 
for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”56 
At the very center of the spherical model would find the classroom, where it is virtually 
undisputed that the protections of the First Amendment would be at their most dim, but rightfully 
so.  A university must be able to exert control over the conduct that takes place in its facilities 
and its curricula.  Taking a slight step back, however, shows us that the limited public forum 
would be the outermost ring of this innermost sphere.  Here, an expressive organization would be 
able to exist with the minimum amount of interference from the university, barring neutral time-
place-manner restrictions.  Sandwiched between this ring and the classroom sphere, however, is 
the “recognized” student organization sphere… a place where the university can impose neutral 
restrictions or requirements in exchange for granting of special privileges.   
                                                        
54
 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n. 5 (1981)). 
55
 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. 
56
 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Both Widmar and Rosenberger were cited by 
the Court in Martinez in regards to the “limited public forum” theory, but will be discussed in more detail in Part II. 
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In any event, existence in these innermost spheres is clearly distinct from the private 
organization sphere.  A student or group of students has the option to form groups outside of the 
university sphere where First Amendment protections are more rigorous.  Under this method of 
analysis, the legal basis of the Court’s decisions appear much more straightforward than the 
current climate of debate would seem to convey.  Groups like CLS have attempted—and for the 
most part successfully managed—to obscure the true legal debate by falsely equating 
circumstances occurring within different spheres and framing any attempt to regulate in and 
among the accepted spheres as “attacks” on religion. 
 
Part II:  Rhetoric as a Tool of Obfuscation and Confusion 
 
“In courtrooms and schoolrooms, offices and shops, public buildings and even churches… those 
who believe in God are increasingly threatened, punished, and silenced.”57 
 
“If homosexuals succeed, “all people – especially Christians – who do not affirm homosexual 
behavior could be silenced, punished, and possibly even jailed for so-called discrimination and 
intolerance.”58 
 
 The quotations above provide a small sampling of how groups such as CLS are 
attempting to frame conflicts between civil regulations and religious practices as “attacks.”  CLS 
indicated in its amicus brief for the Dale case that the cause of their defensive rhetoric stemmed 
in part from the Smith decision: “After this Court’s restriction of exemptions for religious 
persons from neutral, generally applicable laws, in Employment Division v. Smith,… , religious 
persons and organizations are vulnerable to such attacks.”59 
 What CLS either does not want to accept, refuses to confront, or perhaps hopes will 
escape notice, is that far from “attacks,” curtailments of religious free exercise have always 
                                                        
57
 Alliance Defense Fund – Defending Religious Freedom in America, 
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/ReligiousFreedom (last visited May 15, 2011). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Brief for Christian Legal Society, et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000)(No. 99-699), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 156 at *5 [hereinafter CLS Amicus Brief]. 
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occurred, and vary depending on the surrounding circumstances.  The language employed 
however, adopts the position that religious free exercise is absolute,
60
 something that every case 
cited in this comment has refuted.
61
  Nonetheless, CLS and its brethren plod forward with 
rhetoric and disingenuous legal arguments, perhaps hoping it will create a movement to overturn 
Smith, and impose preferential exceptions.  To illustrate, this section will examine more closely 
the argument put forward by CLS in the Martinez case as well as in its amicus brief from the Boy 
Scouts v. Dale case, as that brief almost resembles a complaint which could have been filed in 
this case, dealing with university anti-discrimination policies and their danger to religious free-
exercise.
62
 
 
A.  Mere Puffery or Deliberately Misleading? 
 
 Exaggeration and hyperbole can be a useful in a debate, but CLS has taken these tools to 
the extreme.  In his oral argument before the Supreme Court, CLS Attorney Michael McConnell 
opened with the statement that under Hastings’ policy “a student who does not even believe in 
the Bible is entitled to demand to lead a Christian Bible study…”63  This contention is not 
remotely true.  Hastings’ policy requires that any student be able to seek a leadership position in 
                                                        
60
 For example, statements such as “… a group may object to governmental coercion -- or at best, governmental 
bribery -- to disaffirm, in effect, their commitment to particular religious convictions.” CLS Amicus Brief, supra 
note 59, at *16.  
61
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a “Registered Student Organization (RSO)”64 but it does not deny the organization the right to 
set neutral qualification requirements.
65
  For instance, several RSOs already condition 
membership and leadership eligibility through neutral polices which are “designed to ensure that 
students join because of their commitment to a group’s vitality, not its demise.”66  Examples of 
acceptable requirements include: attending meetings regularly, payment of dues, attendance 
requirements, and minimum membership time requirements to be eligible for an officer 
position.
67
  What it definitely doesn’t say is that any student can walk into an organization and 
demand leadership.  Even after the decision came down in favor of Hastings, the CLS remained 
firm in its rhetoric, releasing a press release stating that the “Hastings policy actually requires 
CLS to allow atheists to lead its Bible studies and the College Democrats to accept the election 
of Republican officers in order for the groups to be recognized on campus.”68 
 
B.  Legal Fallacies 
 
 Beyond just the social rhetoric, looking at the actual legal arguments raised by CLS also 
calls into question their candor.  Most egregious is their refusal to take into account 
circumstances when applying case law.  For example, in their amicus brief for Dale, CLS alleged 
that “…in the post-Smith legal framework, the right of Boy Scouts to select its leadership 
according to its own criteria will directly affect the ability of religious student groups to select 
their leadership free from government coercion.”69  The Martinez decision shows that this 
contention is facially flawed, but the basis of the analogy itself is incorrect.  As Part I illustrated, 
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the Boy Scouts exist in a sphere of regulation and free expression quite different from that of a 
student organization at a university.  At issue in Boy Scouts was state regulation of a private 
expressive organization, not university regulation of a university student organization.  While 
CLS may try to obscure this fact, it is not a distinction without a difference.  At oral argument, 
CLS stated that “[t]he State is Hastings.  We are perfectly private."70  This is simply not accurate.  
Student organizations, while they resemble (or even have the same name as) a private expressive 
organization outside of the university sphere, do not transform them into the same being.
71
  The 
University is itself a restrictive organization that does not take every person who may wish to 
attend.  It selects a certain group from the general population to participate in academic studies, 
and attempts to provide an educational atmosphere for attendees.  “A college’s commission -- 
and its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical approaches -- is not confined to the 
classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational process.”72  
Universities, therefore, often encourage students to form organizations to discuss differing 
philosophies and express diverse opinions.  While universities traditionally do this, it is not a 
right of students.  A university is not a fortress or a prison that confines its attendees.  The 
Students are free to come and go from the campus, and are able not constrained from joining 
local chapters of organizations such as CLS.  It is a convenience that students form their own 
versions of such organizations on campuses.  CLS, nonetheless, wishes to liken the relationship 
between the state and the national CLS with that of the University and Student-Org CLS.  This 
would obviate the University as a player in its own home. 
                                                        
70
 Martinez Transcript, supra note 63 at 14. 
71
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 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988-89. 
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 What a university cannot do is discriminate on the basis of viewpoint if it has opened a 
limited public forum within its bounds.
73
  CLS, foreshadowing the case eventually brought 
against Hastings, alleged in its amicus brief for Dale that:  
public universities have threatened religious student groups with loss of access to campus 
facilities if the groups refuse to agree to accept as officers persons who do not share the 
groups’ core religious values, including their religious viewpoints regarding homosexual 
conduct.
74
 
 
This statement again expresses the untruth that any university is attempting to force any specific 
students into officer positions.  More important, however, is that CLS offered no examples at this 
time of any university that actually engaged in this practice, and would not file a complaint 
against Hastings for several years to come.  The cases CLS does point to, however, offer no 
support for this statement as constructed.  CLS cites Widmar v. Vincent
75
 and Rosenberger v. 
University of Virginia
76
 as support for why such “behavior” by universities is forbidden, however 
these cases deal with issues that are fundamentally different than the concept CLS is attempting 
to advance. 
 In Widmar, for example, the issue was that the university, “which makes its facilities 
generally available for the activities of registered student groups” subsequently closed its 
facilities to a “registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and 
religious discussion.”77  The aggrieved organization was already an approved organization which 
had been operating for several years and had complied with all university policies.
78
  The Court 
determined, therefore that the discrimination was based on the viewpoint of organization, their 
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religious speech.
79
  The regulation was not neutral on its face, it prohibited “the use of University 
buildings or grounds for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.”80  This 
demonstrates that a university cannot open its doors to all student organizations and then 
subsequently shut one out for what they choose to discuss,
81
 but it doesn’t confront any issues of 
organization leadership nor antidiscrimination regulations. 
 In Rosenberger the university authorized student organizations to contract with outside 
printers for publications but “withheld any authorization for payments on behalf of petitioners 
for the sole reason that their student paper ‘primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in 
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.’”82  The student group was designated a “Contracted 
Independent Organization,” a status which distinguished it from a “religious organization,” yet it 
was denied funding because it espoused a religious viewpoint.
83
  As in Widmar, the Court said 
the university could not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.
84
 
 Both cases remain good law today, and are important for protecting student organizations 
from arbitrary regulations that target their speech for regulation.  What CLS would like these 
cases to express, is that religious expression deserves special protection within the university 
sphere.  CLS cites both Widmar and Rosenberger in their arguments against Hastings’ policy.85  
As previously described, the situations are factually distinguishable.  In both Widmar and 
Rosenberger, the organization experiencing viewpoint discrimination was already a university-
                                                        
79
 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265. 
80
 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n. 3. 
81
 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (“University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups.  Having done 
so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable 
constitutional norms.”). 
82
 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23. 
83
 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826. 
84
 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
85
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)(No. 08-1371), 2010 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2091 at *29. 
 20 
certified organization.
86
  Therefore, it had achieved equal status to the other organizations yet 
was still being treated dissimilar.  Widmar did not establish a right for a religious student 
organization to exist, but instead that if a religious student organization does exist, it must be 
treated the same as all other student organizations.  This is the key distinction which CLS hopes 
to avoid in Martinez, where it is asking to be made equivalent to a RSO without abiding by the 
same rules… as Justice Ginsburg states “CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other 
organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings’ policy.”87   
 What CLS also wishes to ignore that in both decisions is that the Court consistently stated 
that the university may limit its forum, “reserving it for certain groups of for the discussion of 
certain topics.”88  Where a university runs into trouble with viewpoint discrimination is where it 
has opened up a forum and subsequently attempts to manage the messages on an ad hoc basis.
89
  
Hastings, perhaps with a slight bit of irony, has not opened up its forums to all-comers.  Some 
means of communication with students and methods of conducting group activities on the 
campus are subject to a threshold commitment that the group not discriminate on the basis of 
several enumerated statuses.
90
  If a group does not wish to abide by the threshold requirements, it 
may not participate in certain forums, but may in others that are open to all-comers.
91
  Hastings 
stated to the Court, that “the school would be pleased to provide CLS the use of Hastings 
facilities for its meetings and activities” should it choose to remain unrecognized, as well as 
allow it “access to chalkboards and generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its 
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events.”92  In this respect, the Court noted that “Hastings would do nothing to suppress CLS’s 
endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level support for them.”93 
C. “Religious Exception” Fallacy Gaining Traction 
The language that has been employed of “religious exception” is used repeatedly, 
although as has been described, “exception” is something of a misnomer.  In the cases involving 
student organizations, the First Amendment is not being invoked as a shield to protect the 
organization’s message, but is rather used as a sword to attack rules which bind everyone else.  
The “exception” desired is not to protect an organization’s right to speak or assemble, but the 
right to obtain a preferred status without playing by the rules.  Nonetheless, organizations have 
been very effective in framing their message as one of defense and “exceptions.”  They have 
found support from well-learned quarters who also fall into the trap of defending “exceptions” by 
conflating the spheres of First Amendment protections.   
Joan Howarth, the Dean of Michigan State University College of Law, for example, takes 
such a position in her article, “Teaching Freedom:  Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups.”94  In 
this article, Dean Howarth states that nondiscrimination policies of the school should not trump 
expressive association rights.
95
  While I have demonstrated that student group First Amendment 
rights would fall in the inner spheres, Dean Howarth supports her conclusion by citing to cases 
which occur outside of the University sphere.
96
  Further, Dean Howarth virtually ignores the fact 
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that what CLS sought from UC Hastings was not merely freedom of expression, but wanted 
“recognized status,” which would allow them access to subsidies, etc.  She states that “in a 
limited public forum created to allow students to form groups on the basis of shared beliefs, 
preventing faith-based groups from using their beliefs to organize a group should not be 
dismissed as viewpoint neutrality.”97  However, such consideration by the Court is consistent 
with its limited public forum precedent, and is consistent with Hastings’ behavior.  Dean 
Howarth later points out that Hastings “never interfered with the chapter’s existence until it 
refused to sign the nondiscrimination policy.”98  It was permitted to hold bible studies, 
barbeques, etc., but it was not allowed “recognized” status.99  This is an important distinction.  
Dean Howarth’s argument clearly breaks down where she states that “when a school or 
university establishes a limited public forum for student organizations, the student organizations 
constitute private entities, with identities distinct and separate from that of the school or 
university.”100  This is contradicted by the very nature of a “student organization,” which seeks 
to define itself both by its mission, as well as the fact it is tied to the University within which it 
operates.  A student organization does not seek to be “distinct” from the University, but to define 
itself as part of it… otherwise, there would be no need to form an organization within a 
University at all.  A group could merely form outside of the campus and visit the limited public 
forum as it wished.  To emphasize separation, Dean Howarth suggests that the university 
“provide specific disclaimers that … alert everyone that student organization are not within the 
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general nondiscrimination policies for access to educational opportunities.”101  Dean Howarth 
again misses the point of what CLS is seeking.  They were already in a position where they were 
allowed to discriminate and still have access to campus facilities, what they wanted, and what 
their suit involved, was a request for less separation.
102
  They wanted a status which allowed 
them to use Hastings’ name, and would use student monies to subsidize their events.103 
As we have seen, the Martinez Court did not follow the reasoning of CLS nor Dean 
Howarth, and instead maintained consistency with its prior holdings.  It is evident, however, that 
when the complicated area of nested spheres of First Amendment jurisprudence come into play, 
they are made more obscure and convoluted by emotion-provoking rhetoric.  What CLS puts 
forth as a legal argument, and what Dean Howarth perhaps inadvertently supports, is that 
religious beliefs deserve special treatment under the Constitution.  This is clearly against not 
only the language of precedent but also the spirit of the cases as well.  With a success in the 
university setting, combined with the successes of Dale and Hurley, it seems that CLS was 
attempting to gather holdings permitting preferential exceptions in a variety of spheres.  While 
speculative, it would appear that CLS hoped to be able to weave these holdings into a broader 
argument for religious exemptions to anti-discrimination laws at all levels, in essence nullifying 
Smith.  CLS did not obtain such a victory, however the kulturekampf was not being waged on 
just the judicial front.  In Part III, we will take a step back from the university sphere and take a 
broader look at how religious protection rhetoric is being codified, which will add credence to 
the speculation that an effort to nullify anti-discrimination laws through a religious “opt-out” is, 
in fact, occurring. 
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Part III:  Kulturekampf and Rhetoric beyond the University Sphere 
 
  
 In the last few years, several of the New England states have passed laws codifying the 
right of “civil marriage” for same-sex couples.104  In the four states that codified the right to 
same-sex marriage in 2009, and in the proposed 2011 legislation in Maryland, however, each bill 
contains a “religious freedom” provision.  In fact, in Vermont and Maine, the bills themselves 
contained “religious freedom” in the titles.105 
 Maine’s now void law, and the New Hampshire law both are affirm protections for clergy 
to be immune from any suit for refusing to solemnize a same-sex marriage.
106
  This “protection” 
seems largely a tautology as the state has never had the authority to reach into a religious 
organization and demand it provide a sacrament to all-comers.  If that were a valid fear, the rise 
of civil divorce would pose a much greater threat to religious institutions’ marriage sacraments.  
However, as all religious institutions’ clergy are free to discriminate against those who have 
civilly divorced on the basis of religious doctrine, it does not stand to reason that they would be 
unable to turn away same-sex couples seeking marriage if it also was contrary to doctrine.  In 
fact, such language as that within the Maine and New Hampshire bills appears to be aimed at 
quelling the rhetoric which we have seen throughout this paper.
107
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 While Part II described student organizations seeking “religious exceptions” to gain 
access to preferred status at universities, in the outer spheres, the “religious protections” sought 
can have a substantially more insidious results.  In fact, aside from “affirming” religious 
freedom, they seemed aimed at creating broader “religious exceptions” not only for marriage 
ceremonies but reaching into anti-discrimination laws as well.
108
  In Connecticut and Vermont’s 
laws, and in Maryland’s proposed bill, the language differs slightly as to the religious 
“protections,” but all three exceed the mere iteration that the laws will leave the “clergy” free to 
discriminate.  The three all apply to “a religious organization, association, or society, or any 
nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with 
a religious organization, association, or society.”109  Additionally, Connecticut and Vermont state 
that these organizations “shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, 
facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or 
celebration of a marriage.”110  Maryland’s “related to” language includes solemnization as well 
as any “promotion of marriage” events which may occur “through religious programs, 
counseling, educational courses, summer camps, and retreats.”111  This language is significantly 
more encompassing than is necessary to assure religious institutions that the state is not going to 
interfere with their doctrines.  In fact, what it appears to do is give a preferential exception to 
those religious (and religious affiliated) groups which have taken a step into the public sphere.  
Again, we have a situation where the First Amendment has become a sword instead of shield.  
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Rather than protect the religious organization from overreach by the state, we now have religious 
organizations expanding into the public sphere but refusing to accept the rules which bind other 
non-religious yet similarly situated organizations and people.  Beyond the churches, synagogues, 
mosques, etc., these statutes create questions as to where the boundaries of “exemptions” lie.  
How much “association” is required to invoke the exemption, for example?  How is a nonprofit 
operated “in conjunction with” a religious organization defined?  And when a religious 
institution owns housing, or rents facilities to the market at large, have they been given a pass to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation?  Professor Taylor Flynn of Western New England 
College School of Law, has pointed out some of the dangers he sees lurking in the religious 
“freedom” language proposed for the civil marriage bills.112  He believes that the language being 
employed is a departure from centuries of practice where religious freedom would cede ground 
“to equality in the public realm.”113  Thus, if someone wished to take enter the commercial 
environment, they could not bring their biases with them into the marketplace.  What appears to 
be the goal of these religious freedom clauses today, however, is to reverse this practice.  By 
building in exceptions, individuals such as same-sex couples could be “required to conform their 
lives to others’ religious beliefs as a condition of their equal participation in the marketplace.”114 
It is the same movement from a private sphere into a public sphere with a demand to play by 
different rules that we saw in the university context in Martinez but with a broader effect. 
 In an effort to appease the loud voices calling out that same-sex marriage “violates” 
religious freedom, people like Maryland State Senator Jamie Raskin are determined to make sure 
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that civil marriage bills also reflect the “main value” of “absolute religious freedom.”115  But this 
“absolute freedom” is no longer for clergy or within religious practices, it is expanding into the 
public sphere.  The judicial branch has shown that private expressive organizations such as the 
Boy Scouts, are protected from state law overreach, which implies that more clearly “religious” 
oriented organizations would find more First Amendment protection without express statutory 
provision for exemptions.  Nonetheless, these exemptions are being added, and they extend 
beyond the merely “expressive” private organizations.  The truly disturbing legal trend is not 
what church leaders have called “the ominous creep of laws allowing same-sex marriage,”116 but 
rather that religious organizations are taking themselves into the public sphere and then 
demanding religious “exemptions” from neutral laws such as anti-discrimination statutes.  The 
kulturekampf is not a battle where only one side seeks to advance.  It appears that what may have 
been CLS’ goal through the judicial path has found more success in the reverse direction along 
the political path.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
 This paper has laid out a framework to demonstrate that the protections of the First 
Amendment will interact differently with anti-discrimination regulations depending upon context 
and circumstances.  A university organization, for example, is not on par with a private 
organization outside the university context, both occupy distinct spheres of being.   Therefore the 
rights of students in a limited public forum are not equivalent to an individual in a private 
expressive organization operating in a public forum.  Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of 
effort made to conflate these spheres and develop a jurisprudence and social parlance of 
“religious exceptions” and “religious protections.”  Justice Scalia mentioned a “Kulturekampf” 
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in his Romer v. Evans dissent,
117
 and we have seen that there is, indeed, one being waged.  From 
the Court’s pronouncement in Smith that religious organizations must comply with neutral laws, 
there has been steady movement by religious organizations to escape its binds.  This paper 
demonstrated that while often the terminology frames the issue as religion “under attack” and in 
need of a protecting “exception,” in fact, the goal can be for special status or preferred treatment 
without abiding by neutral regulations.  To be sure, it is not the intent of this paper to dismiss all 
calls for religious exemptions as fraudulent.  There are cases where laws can overreach into the 
private expressive organization’s sphere, but the Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness 
to stop such encroachments.  
Courts, governments, and legal minds must be vigorous in scrutinizing calls for “religious 
exceptions” as the rhetoric of the last decade has worked to obscure the logical legal framework 
that is in place.  Instead, the rhetoric appeals to emotion and creates the idea that somehow anti-
discrimination laws are infiltrating the private sphere and “attacking” religion, rather than only 
applying when religion takes a step into the public sphere.  Martinez suggests that the Court will 
also restrain attempts of religious exemption encroachment the other direction as well, but there 
is still the concern that the anti-discrimination laws of the state will still be circumvented by 
rhetoric aimed at the political arena.  In the same breath that states are recognizing same-sex 
marriage, there is a risk that other anti-discrimination statutes are being undermined in the name 
of “religious freedom.”  As Justice Scalia stated in Smith, the Court has never held that “when 
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions 
but the conduct itself must be free from government regulation.”118  While there may be 
resistance within private religious organizations to the anti-discrimination protections afforded to 
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homosexuals, they cannot be allowed to alter the legal landscape under the guise of First 
Amendment protection.  To do so is to open the floodgates for constitutionally sanctioned 
discrimination. 
 
